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BEFORE THE APPELLATE BODY OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION

CHINA – MEASURES AFFECTING IMPORTS OF
AUTOMOBILE PARTS
(WT/DS339/R;WT/DS340/R;WT/DS/342)

AMICUS CURIAE SUBMISSION BY SUNGJOON CHO

10 OCTOBER 2008

I. Introduction
1. Recognizing the legal authority of the Appellate Body to accept and consider an
unsolicited amicus curiae submission,1 I respectfully submit this brief through
the Appellate Body Secretariat.
2. The gist of this dispute is whether the Chinese customs office should impose an
import duty of 25 percent on certain auto parts having the essential character of
motor vehicles while it levies only 10 percent on ordinary auto parts which do not
retain such character. Generally, WTO members hold the “right” to interpret
Harmonized System (HS) and this is why different members may have different
interpretations in the same tariff classification issues, which was the case in this
dispute.2 However, the panel ignored this right of importing countries and
instead equated the object and purpose of the WTO Agreement with
predictability and expectation exclusively for exporting countries, as it relates to
“the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade.”3 This is a flawed
interpretation which severely undermines the balance of rights and obligations
among WTO members and thus should be corrected by the Appellate Body.

II. The Panel erred in applying the National Treatment discipline
(GATT Article III:2) in a dispute involving custom duties (GATT
Article II:1).
Appellate Body Report, United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain HotRolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom,
WT/DS138/AB/R, adopted 7 June 2000, paras. 39, 42; Appellate Body Report, European
Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, adopted 23 October 2002, ¶¶
157, 160.
2 The panel acknowledged this point. China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts,
the Report of the Panel, WT/DS339/R, WT/DS340/R, WT/DS342/R, circulated on July 18, 2008,
¶ 7.538 [hereinafter the Panel Report].
3 Id., ¶ 7.460.
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3. What is before the Appellate Body is a typical “classification” dispute under
Article II. It is worthy of noting that all import duties may be indeed
“discriminatory” in the sense that they establish tariff barriers against otherwise
free flow of foreign imports. However, to the extent that WTO members impose
tariffs under their schedules those tariffs should be protected in the WTO system
and thus are not subject to Article III. Negotiation, not adjudication, should
reduce the level of these tariffs.

4. Even if these two Articles (Article II and III) arguendo rival each other in their
application in this dispute, the panel should have elected to apply Article II. It is a
well established interpretive principle of public international law that a tribunal
must respect policy discretion of sovereign countries in times of doubt. The
Appellate Body has also recognized this principle of in dubio mitius.4 In this
dispute, applying Article II definitely better suits the preserving of China’s fiscal
autonomy.

5. Concomitantly, the panel’s “conditional” approach which led the panel to
conclude that China violated both Articles II and III was flawed. It is simply
illogical to conceive that the same measure could fall within the rubric of a border
measure and at the same time of an internal measure. This type of reasoning,
albeit conditional, is prone to severe unpredictability of the WTO jurisprudence,

Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), ¶165, n. 154, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
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in particular from a remedial perspective. The panel violated Article 3.2 of
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) since its approach neither “provid[ed]
security and predictability to the multilateral trading system” nor “clarif[ied] the
existing provisions of those agreements.” As the panel in Korea - Various
Measures on Beef did,5 the panel in this dispute should have addressed Article II
first and then declined to review the Article III claim exercising the judicial
economy.

6. In its refusal to apply Article II in this dispute, the panel ran afoul of the
interpretative principle under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. Article II:1 (b) reads:
The products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to any
contracting party, which are the products of territories of other contracting
parties, shall, on their importation into the territory to which the
Schedule relates, and subject to the terms, conditions or qualifications set
forth in that Schedule, be exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess
of those set forth and provided therein. Such products shall also be
exempt from all other duties or charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with the importation in excess of those imposed on the date of
this Agreement or those directly and mandatorily required to be imposed
thereafter by legislation in force in the importing territory on that date.
(italics added)
7. The panel held that:
[W]e consider that, taken together, the terms "on their [products]
importation" and "into the territory" in the first sentence of Article II:1(b)
suggest that "ordinary customs duties" are charges which the obligation to
pay accrues based on the products as they enter the customs territory of
another Member. In particular, the strict temporal element of the word
"on", which points to the precise moment of the action it modifies,

Korea- Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, the Report of Panel, ¶780,
WS/DS169/R (July 31, 2000).
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indicates that an "ordinary customs duty" must be assessed on the basis of
a good at the moment of importation. (italics added)
8. This is an unduly narrow reading of Article II:1 (B). The panel predicated its
whole logic on a mechanical interpretation which employed only a couple of
phrases under the Article in an exclusive manner. According to the panel, an
ordinary custom duty must be always imposed precisely at the very moment of
importation. However, it is an inorganic interpretation which totally ignores
other important phrases modifying this temporal element, such as “subject to the
terms, conditions or qualifications.” The correct reading is that ordinary customs
duties, which are usually imposed at the time of importation, may be imposed at
a later stage. Interpreting the Article in this way, the Chinese customs office may
impose on foreign auto parts an import duty of 25% after the Verification Center
completes its assessment as to whether these parts meet the criteria of essential
character as motor vehicles.6 In other words, such criteria represent the “terms,
conditions or qualifications” under the Article and thus modify the temporal
requirement in collecting tariffs (“on their importation into the territory”).

9. Likewise, the panel’s constricted reading which disassociates the phrase of “in
connection from the importation” from ordinary custom duties is overly artificial.
Such reading ignores the main message of Article II, which prohibits WTO
members from imposing any customs duties exceeding their tariff schedules
regardless of characterization (“ordinary” or “other”) of such duties or their
temporal dimension as long as they are import-related.
6

The Panel Report, ¶¶ 7.67-7.69.
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10. The panel also failed to take into account the “General Rules of
Interpretation” (GIR) under the Harmonized System as well as decisions of the
HS Committee of the World Customs Organization (WCO) as a critical “context”
as to Article II:1(b). The Appellate Body in EC – Chicken Cuts viewed that:
The Harmonized System is not, formally, part of the WTO Agreement, as it
has not been incorporated, in whole or in part, into that Agreement.
Nevertheless, the concept of "context", under Article 31, is not limited to
the treaty text—namely, the WTO Agreement—but may also extend to "any
agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty", within the meaning of
Article 31(2)(a) of the Vienna Convention, and to "any instrument which
was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the
treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the
treaty", within the meaning of Article 31(2)(b) of the Vienna Convention.
Moreover, should the criteria in Article 31(3)(c) be fulfilled, the
Harmonized System may qualify as a "relevant rule[] of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties".
11. GIR 2(a) provides:
Any reference in a heading to an article shall be taken to include a
reference to that article incomplete or unfinished, provided that, as
presented, the incomplete or unfinished article has the essential character
of the complete or finished article. It shall also be taken to include a
reference to that article complete or finished (or falling to be classified as
complete or finished by virtue of this rule), presented unassembled or
disassembled. (emphasis added)
12. GIR 2(a) tends to inform the Chinese measures in question. Imported auto
parts are “incomplete or unfinished” articles which may have the “essential
character” of complete or finished ones and thus be subject to a tariff rate (25%)
corresponding to complete or finished ones (motor vehicles). Again, the panel
narrowly interpreted GIR 2(a), in particular the phrase of “as presented,” and
concluded that it “denotes a temporal meaning, i.e. the moment when a good is
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presented to the customs authority.”7 According to the panel’s reading, China
may not predicate its measures on GIR 2(a) since these measures apply to auto
parts imported through “multiple shipments” and therefore cannot satisfy the “as
presented” requirement.

13. However, as the panel itself noted, the “determination whether multiplicity of
origin shall affect applicability of GIR 2(a) is a matter left to each Contracting
Party.”8 More precisely, the HS Committee decided that “the classification of
goods assembled from elements originating in or arriving from different
countries are matters to be settled by each country in accordance with its own
national regulations.” Therefore, it is obvious that the China enjoys wide
discretion in classifying auto parts having the essential character of motor
vehicles as motor vehicles. The opposite conclusion reached by the panel is an
unacceptable second-guessing which ignores the context of GATT Article II:1(b)
and thus runs afoul of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

14. Finally, in its consideration of the “object and purpose” of the WTO
Agreement, the panel disproportionately accentuated the complainants
(exporting countries)’ concerns through GATT Article III:2 and therefore
undermined the defendant (importing country)’s expectation embedded in
Article II:1(b). The panel held that:
[T]he "security and predictability of the reciprocal and mutually
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs
7
8

Id., ¶ 7.412
Id, ¶ 7.432
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and other barriers to trade ", which is a recognized object and purpose of
the WTO Agreement, would be undermined if a charge were to be
considered as an ordinary customs duty even when the obligation to pay
the charge accrues after goods have already entered into the customs
territory of China and been assembled into complete goods of the
corresponding kind. We therefore share the systemic concerns expressed
by the complainants that if the assembly of the products after their
importation into the customs territory of a Member could provide a basis
for tariff classification, the tariff classification system would undermine
the national treatment obligation under Article III of the GATT 1994,
which is one of the core principles of the WTO Agreements. Such an
interpretation would blur the fundamental distinction between measures
falling within the scope of Article III:2 and those falling within the scope of
Article II:1(b), first sentence, of the GATT 1994.9
15. This biased understanding of the WTO’s object and purpose has no place in
the WTO’s jurisprudence. The Appellate Body in the EC – Computer Equipment
ruled that:
[W]e disagree with the Panel that the maintenance of the security and
predictability of tariff concessions allows the interpretation of a concession
in the light of the "legitimate expectations" of exporting Members, i.e.,
their subjective views as to what the agreement reached during tariff
negotiations was. The security and predictability of tariff concessions
would be seriously undermined if the concessions in Members' Schedules
were to be interpreted on the basis of the subjective views of certain
exporting Members alone.10
16. In sum, the panel’s interpretation of GATT Article II:1 was inconsistent with
Article 31:1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties because the panel
misread the text of Article II:1, disregarded its critical context (the GIR 2(a) and
the HS Committee’s decision), and misconstrued the object and purpose of the
WTO Agreement.

Id., ¶ 7.211
European Communities – Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment,
WT/DS62/AB/R; WT/DS67/AB/R; WT/DS68/AB/R, the Appellate Body Report, ¶ 82 (June 5,
1998).
9

10
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III. In its conditional interpretation of Article II:1, the panel wrongly
disregarded importing countries’ discretion in the tariff classification
under the “multiple shipment” situation.
17. As discussed above, the gist of the Chinese measures in question is China’s
treatment of certain auto parts as motor vehicles for the purpose of tariff
classification if the former have the essential character of the latter under China’s
internal criteria. The existence of GIR 2(a) as an important context to GATT
Article II:1 tends to justify these measures.

18. However, the panel refused to accept this position by narrowly interpreting
GIR 2(a) in a way which unduly ignored an importing country’s discretion in
tariff classification. According to the panel, the language “as presented” in GIR
2(a) presupposes only the “single shipments” scenario in the importation of auto
parts and therefore precludes the “multiple shipments” scenarios on which the
Chinese measures are based.11

19. As the panel noted itself, the HS Committee’s decisions function as critical
guidance in interpreting both GATT Article II:1 and WTO members’ tariff
schedules, as was confirmed by the Appellate Body in EC – Compute Equipment
and EC – Chicken Cuts.12 The HS Committee had concluded earlier that each
importing country should determine whether it would treat split consignments as
a single entity in interpreting “as presented” under GIR 2(a).13 In particular, the
HS Committee decided in 1995 that “the questions of split consignments and the
Panel Report, ¶ 7.523.
Id., ¶ 7.423.
13 Id., ¶¶ 7.408-409.
11
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classification of goods assembled from elements originating in or arriving from
different countries are matters to be settled by each country in accordance with
its own national regulations.”14

20. The same discretion of the importing countries is secured in constructing the
“essential character” requirement in GIR 2(a). As the panel acknowledged, the
WCO Secretariat has noted that “the Nomenclature and Explanatory Notes are
largely silent regarding the meaning of the "essential character" of the complete
or finished article as it appears in GIR 2(a)” and that “the Committee has not
formally developed principles, nor has the Committee ruled formally on the
classification of unassembled sets of parts for motor vehicles of Chapter 87.”15 In
other words, “absent specific guidance from the nomenclature (i.e. legal
provisions) or the Committee (i.e. interpretation of the nomenclature), it is
within the purview of national customs administrations to interpret provisions
such as GIR 2(a).”16

21. The HS Committee’s recognition of importing countries’ wide discretion in
the matter of tariff classification undoubtedly supports an interpretation of “as
presented” in a way which accommodates the aforementioned “multiple
shipments” scenario or “the classification of goods assembled from elements
originating in or arriving from different countries.”17 Therefore, certain
incomplete or unfinished auto parts having the “essential character” of motor
Id., ¶ 7.425; HSC/16/Nov.95, DOC.39.600.
Panel Report, ¶ 7.529.
16 Id., ¶ 7.531.
17 Id., ¶ 7.397.
14
15
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vehicles may be classified as motor vehicles at the discretion of importing
countries in a way consistent with GATT Article II:1.

22. It is truly unfathomable that the panel defied such unequivocal interpretive
guidance. The panel viewed that treating unassembled parts (such as auto parts)
as assembled articles (such as motor vehicles) under GIR 2(a) must be limited to
“technological” reasons such as difficulties in packaging and handling.18
According to the panel, GIR 2(a) does not address the measures in question since
the tariff classification under the measures represents “industrial,” not merely
technological, consideration.19 However, the panel’s view is groundless for the
following reasons.

23. First, surprisingly the panel based its whole logic for the above-mentioned
position on a four-decades-old document under the Customs Cooperation
Council (CCC), which was the WCO’s predecessor. According to the legislative
history of GIR 2(a) noted by the CCC Secretariat in 1963, the tariff nomenclature
was originally designed for technological classification of different articles.20 Yet
this is merely a “historical background” of draft interpretive rules, as the WCO
Secretariat reaffirmed in its letter to the panel dated on July 30, 2007. The WCO
Secretariat emphasized that the text of the Explanatory Note (V) to GIR 2(a),
which reflects the CCC Secretariat’s historical observation, is “merely an
explanation of historical reasons for articles being shipped unassembled or
Id., ¶ 7.439
Id.
20 Id., ¶ 7.439; Customs Co-operation Council, Nomenclature Committee, 10th Session, Brussels,
February 26, 1963, Document No. 10.195E.
18
19
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disassembled.”21 While it is true such historical background may provide certain
guidance in the panel’s interpretation of the current text of GIR 2(a), it is still a
type of “supplemental” interpretive means as “preparatory work” of the text of
GIR 2(a) under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It can
by no means surpass more direct interpretive means such as the HS Committee’s
decision in 1995 as a “subsequent practice” under Article 31:3 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.

24. Second, even if we accept arguendo the historical explanation highlighting a
technological dimension of the tariff nomenclature as the sole interpretive
guidance for GIR 2(a), it does not necessarily preclude other non-technological
considerations of importing countries. As the panel itself acknowledged, the
Explanatory Note (V) to GIR 2(a) provides that “when the goods are presented
unassembled or disassembled, it is usually for reasons such as “requirements or
convenience of packing, handling or transport.””22 This means that importing
countries may accommodate non-technological reasons such as the imposing of
different custom duties under certain circumstances, as was in this dispute.
Moreover, even if Paragraph 10 of the HS Committee decision in 1995 does not
refer to the multiple shipment situation in this dispute as the panel observed,23
the same Paragraph never actually bars the multiple shipment scenarios either.
In fact, the panel explicitly recognized this very point. The panel viewed that:
The WCO Secretariat states that it is inclined to regard the reference in
paragraph 10 to "the classification of goods assembled from elements
Panel Report, ¶ 7.441, n. 747 (emphasis added).
Panel Report, ¶ 7.441
23 Id.
21

22
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originating in or arriving from multiple countries" rather as reflecting the
HS Committee's view that the determination whether "multiplicity of
origin" shall affect the applicability of GIR 2(a) is a matter left to each
Contracting Party and that the HS does not address the applicability of
GIR 2(a) to the classification of goods of mixed origin.24
If the WTO members had truly desired to bar any non-technological
considerations in the matter of tariff classification, they would have stipulated
explicitly, as was the case in the area of the rules of origin.25

25. Third, the very distinction between “technological” considerations and nontechnical (“economic”) considerations in the tariff classification is not always
clear cut. All tariff nomenclature issues may be economic in the sense that they
are all to impose custom duties after all. As the panel itself observed,
“classification of a good into the proper tariff heading is an essential first step for
assessing the appropriate tariff duty on the product.”26 Simply speaking, the
panel must leave to importing countries the question of whether these nontechnological considerations should be included in the tariff classification. It is
not for the panel to decide.

26. In sum, the panel erred in that it misinterpreted GIR 2(a) in a way which
would unduly undermine importing countries’ discretion as to their tariff
classification under the multiple shipment situation as in this dispute.

Id., ¶ 7.442.
"Until the work programme for the harmonization of rules of origin set out in Part IV is
completed, Members shall ensure that: […] (b) notwithstanding the measure or instrument of
commercial policy to which they are linked, their rules of origin are not used as instruments to
pursue trade objectives directly or indirectly[.]" (emphasis added)
26 Panel Report, ¶ 7.449.
24
25
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IV. Conclusion

27. For the abovementioned reasons, the panel’s interpretation breached general
and supplemental rules of interpretation under Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. This is hardly “an objective assessment of the
matter before it” and thus the panel failed to discharge its functions under Article
11 of the DSU. In doing so, the panel undermined the delicate balance of rights and
obligations among WTO members. The Appellate Body should correct such flaw
and restore the WTO jurisprudence in this matter.
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